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African Americans and the Struggle for
Opportunity in Florida Public Higher
Education, 1947–1977
Larry Johnson
Deirdre Cobb-Roberts
Barbara Shircliffe
In the decades following World War II, access to higher education
became an important vehicle for expanding opportunity in the United
States. The African American–led Civil Rights Movement challenged
discrimination in higher education at a time when state and federal
government leaders saw strengthening public higher education as
necessary for future economic growth and development. Nationally, the
1947 President’s Commission on Higher Education report Higher
Education for American Democracy advocated dismantling racial,
geographic, and economic barriers to college by radically expanding
public higher education, to be accomplished in large part through the
development of community colleges. Although these goals were widely
embraced across the country, in the South, white leaders rejected the idea
that racial segregation stood in the way of progress. During the decades
followingWorldWar II, white southern educational and political leaders
resisted attempts by civil rights organizations to include desegregation as
part of the expansion of public higher education.1
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The history of public higher education for African Americans in
Florida provides an excellent opportunity to examine these institutional
and political dynamics. FollowingWorldWar II, Florida public higher
education expanded dramatically, while at the same time, state leaders
maintained racial segregation well after Brown v. Board of Education
(1954) declared it to be unconstitutional. Hawkins v. Board of Control
(1954), the first attempt to apply Brown to higher education, became
a notorious example of southern defiance. Florida’s Board of
Control, which oversaw the system of higher education, governors,
the State Supreme Court, legislators, and other state and local officials
engaged in a variety of strategies to continue segregation. In addition to
ongoing litigation to block and delay desegregation, state officials
expanded segregated public higher education through the creation of
a racially separate junior college system. In the 1950s and early
1960s, Florida officials offered enlarged, but still not equal,
educational opportunities for African Americans as an alternative to
desegregation. Following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
these officials responded to increased pressure to desegregate
public higher education by intensifying threats to dismantle black
institutions, implying that African Americans would lose existing
institutions that were educating large numbers of black students if
they continued to press for integration.Whites precipitously closed the
black junior colleges and the only public law school blacks could attend.
Civil rights leaders and African American educators, in turn, argued that
redressing past discrimination and offering educational opportunity to
African Americans required the states both to strengthen historically
black institutions and to desegregate historically white ones. In this
article, we argue that by creating a false choice between black
institutions and integration, Florida officials effectively continued
their historic resistance to equitable access and opportunities for
African American students in the state’s colleges and universities.2
The Development of Florida Public Higher Education before
Brown
When Brown was handed down, there were three public universities
in Florida’s dual system of higher education: the University of Florida
(UF) in Gainesville and Florida State University (FSU) in Tallahassee
for whites only, and Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University
(FAMU) also in Tallahassee, for blacks. Both white universities trace
their origins to legislation passed in 1851 establishing two seminaries of
2Joseph A. Tomberlin, ‘‘Florida and the Desegregation Issue, 1954–1959: A
Summary Overview,’’ The Journal of Negro Education 43 (1974): 457–467.
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higher learning, one east of the SuwanneeRiver and the otherwest of the
river in the panhandle. The Seminary West of the Suwannee River,
located in Tallahassee, provided pre-collegiate training for white men
and women, but its limited collegiate courses were for men only. East
Florida Seminary originally opened in Ocala but was closed during the
Civil War; when it reopened in 1866, it moved to Gainesville.
Several public colleges for whites opened in Florida before the turn
of the twentieth century, primarily serving economically and socially
privileged students. The 1884 opening of Florida Agricultural College in
LakeCity as a landgrant college extendedhigher educationopportunities
to a broader range of Florida’s white population. TheMorrill Act of 1862
that created land grant colleges in the United States was the first
concerted effort by the federal government to expand higher education,
a function previously left to the states. Its purpose was to ‘‘promote the
liberal and practical education of the industrial classes on the several
pursuits and professions in life.’’ Each state was allotted 30,000 acres of
public land for each senator and representative. Proceeds from the sale of
the land were to be used to endow at least one college that would offer
training in agricultural andmechanical arts.3 Supporters of the land grant
colleges viewed their curriculum focused on agriculture, engineering,
mechanics, andminingFcompressed into the familiar ‘‘A&M’’ acronym
Fas a challenge to the intellectual elitism aswell as the ‘‘esoteric’’subjects
of the Ivy League.4 After the turn of the century, Florida Agricultural
College would be combined with the seminary in Gainesville and two
other institutions to create the University of Florida.
Higher education for blacks developed slowly in the South.During
the antebellum period, Florida like other southern states made no
provision for the education of blacks at any level. Two Florida
counties allowed blacks to attend school legally, but only in private
elementary schools.5 In the North, by contrast, blacks enjoyed greater
access to education, andCheney, Lincoln, andWilberforce colleges had
been established before the Civil War. Florida did not open a public
college for blacks until 1887 when the StateNormal School for Colored
Students opened inTallahassee. The curriculum provided instruction in
elementary and secondary subjectsFlike that in many early black and
3Act of July 2, 1862, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503,7 U.S.C.301 et seq., available on the
Higher Education Resource Hub at http://www.higher-ed.org/index.html, hereafter
HERH. The curriculum also included training in ‘‘military tactics.’’
4John Thelin, ‘‘Higher Education and the Public Trough: A Historical
Perspective,’’ in Public Funding and Higher Education: Changing Context and New
Rationales, eds. Edward P. St. John and Michael D. Parsons (Baltimore, MD: John
Hopkins University Press, 2004), 27.
5GilWilson, ‘‘Education of Blacks HereDates Back to 1850,’’ St.Augustine Record,
6 October 2004, http://www.staugustine.com/stories/020802/com_468362.shtml
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indeed white collegesFand focused on preparing African American
teachers. The Second Morrill Act, passed in 1890, provided states land
to endow colleges serving African Americans; the next year Florida’s
black normal school was designated a land grant institution, becoming
one of seventeen black land grant colleges in the South.6 As originally
conceived, the act was intended to promote equality. It forbade paying
for colleges ‘‘where a distinction of race or color ismade in the admission
of students.’’ However, to secure passage sponsors had to compromise
with segregationists. Consequently, the final legislation included
language that allowed funding for segregated colleges: ‘‘the
establishment and maintenance of such colleges separately for white
and colored students shall be held to be in compliance with the provisions
of this act if the fundsybeequitablydivided.’’7 As a result, this legislation
extended educational opportunities to African Americans while allowing
states to deny them access to white colleges and universities. Thus,
southern and border states were able to use federal support in building
their segregated systems of higher education.Under these circumstances,
the land grant money was crucial in sustaining Florida’s black normal
school. After receiving land grant status, the normal school changed its
name to the State Normal and Industrial College for Colored Students.
By 1905, Florida had six colleges for whites and one for blacks. A
seventh white school had been authorized by the legislature, but
Governor Napoleon Bonaparte Broward led an effort to reduce the
number of colleges and create a centralized agency, the Florida Board of
Control, which would govern the state’s higher education system. The
Buckman Act consolidated the six white schools into two. East Florida
Seminary, St. Petersburg Normal and Industrial School, the South
FloridaMilitaryCollege inBartow, and theFloridaAgriculturalCollege
were consolidated to create the University of the State of Florida in
Gainesville. This new university was open to white men only and would
soon shorten its name to theUniversity of Florida. Florida StateCollege
was designated a women’s university and its name changed to Florida
State College for Women. Its name was changed to Florida State
University in 1947 when it became coeducational again. The
Buckman Act designated the Normal School for Colored Students a
postsecondary institution, which opened opportunities for blacks to
study college level subjects. Five years later the college awarded its first
baccalaureate degrees and changed its name to Florida Agricultural and
6JohnW.Davis, ‘‘TheNegro Land-Grant College,’’The Journal of Negro Education
2 (1933): 316, 31–328.
7Morrill Act of 1890, ch. 841, 26 Stat. 417, 7U.S.C. 322 et seq., available atHERH.
See also, Jean L. Preer, Lawyers v. Educators: Black Colleges and Desegregation in Public
Higher Education (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 8.
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Mechanical College for Negroes (FAMC), which remained the only
public college for African American men and women in Florida.8
State funding for the three universities was unequal during the first
decades of the twentieth century. While the white women’s college
initially received state funding equal to what the men’s university
received from its land grant endowment and the state, over time the
state increased the men’s funding much more rapidly than the women’s.
The state continually shortchanged FAMC throughout the period
before Brown. Although FAMC received the same amount of funding
under the land grant program as the UF, it received far less state money.
In 1920, both received $25,000 under the Morrill Act, but UF received
$146,000 from the state while FAMC received only $25,937. By the end
of the Second World War in 1945, both still received $25,000 in land
grantmoney, butUF’s state appropriation had risen to $1,035,000 while
FAMC’s was only $201,097. The meager state funding forced FAMC to
raise funds from private sources to meet regular operating costs. In fact,
one former president described the institution as a ‘‘state-assisted’’
rather than a ‘‘state supported’’ college due to its heavy reliance on
funds from philanthropic organizations and the federal government.9
FAMC faculty and administrator salaries were only a fraction of those at
UF. For example, in 1922, UF paid English professors $2,700 while
FAMC paid them only $800. The UF president received $5,000, more
than twice the $2,250 paid to the FAMC president.10 FAMC was not
allowed to develop graduate and professional programs until mid-
century. Then, it only received a law school under the pressure of
Virgil Hawkins’s lawsuit. Facing the demand to desegregate UF, the
state elevated FAMC to university status in 1953 and changed the name
to Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University (FAMU). While the
new university received some graduate and professional programs, they
were never as extensive as those offered in the whites-only universities.
8Larry Johnson and Borman, Kathryn, ‘‘Competing Ideals of University
Governance: Placing the Conflict between Jeb Bush and Bob Graham in Historical
Context,’’ in Education Reform in Florida: Diversity and Equity in Public Policy, ed. Kathryn
Borman and ShermanDorn (Albany: StateUniversity ofNewYorkPress, 2007). See also,
Jno and Tigert, ‘‘Co-ordination in Florida,’’ Journal of Higher Education 4 (1933): 138–
141. There were several private colleges serving both whites and African Americans in
Florida at the time of the consolidation. Florida Agricultural College had changed its
name to the University of Florida just before consolidation. That name was quickly
appropriated by the new university.
9B.L. Jr. Perry, ‘‘Black Colleges and University in Florida: Past, Present and
Future,’’ Journal of Black Studies 6 (1975): 74.
10Florida Board of Control, Report of the Board of Control (Tallahassee). Data are
from the reports for 1920, 1933, 1935, 1945. For a discussion of unequal state funding of
black colleges seeAlbert L. Samuels, Is SeparateUnequal? BlackColleges and the Challenge to
Desegregation (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2004), 37.
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Thus, when the U.S. Supreme Court handed down the Brown
decisions in 1954 and 1955, Florida’s dual higher education system was
firmly in place. No African American had been allowed to enroll in
either undergraduate or graduate programs at UF or FSU. In contrast,
offering limited programs and chronically underfunded, FAMU was
separate and strikingly unequal to the white schools. Blacks had been
challenging these inequities and fighting to expand their educational
opportunities for a number of years. The next section will examine their
challenges to Florida’s dual system before Brown.
Challenging Segregated Public Higher Education in Florida
Before Brown
In April 1949, thirty-nine-year-old Virgil Hawkins, a graduate of
Edward Waters College and Bethune-Cookman College, two
historically black, private colleges, applied for admission to the
University of Florida School of Law. He was one of five African
Americans to apply for admission to UF graduate programs that
spring. All five went to court after being denied admission. The others
soon dropped their cases, but Hawkins fought for nine years to be
admitted. The state responded to his challenge by authorizing a law
program at FAMC and eventually opening the door for African
Americans to obtain graduate and professional degrees at Florida’s
white public universities, although Hawkins himself would never be
admitted.11
Hawkins had wanted to be a lawyer since childhood, when he had
seen a court in his small town give lengthy sentences to a group of black
men who could not afford lawyers. His family had suffered white
brutality; an uncle had been murdered after an argument with a white
neighbor, and another uncle had been forced to watch as his son was
lynched.12 When he applied for law school, he wanted to do something
to improve the lives of African Americans, and like many faculty and
other students at Bethune-Cookman, he felt the timewas rightFWorld
War II would bring about positive opportunities for change.13 Indeed,
historians consider the decade following World War II a watershed for
11Some useful articles on the Hawkins case are Darryl Paulson and Paul Hawkes,
‘‘Desegregating theUniversity of Florida Law School:Virgil Hawkins v. The Florida Board
of Control,’’ 12 Florida State University Law Review 59 (1984); Lawrence A. Dubin, ‘‘Virgil
Hawkins: AOne-ManCivil RightsMovement,’’ 51 Florida Law Review 913 (1999) http://
web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=047cb73c7581765bf26d240fda078d40&_
docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkVb&_md5=8399d0cf9088ea9a5e1dc2a8df797138.
12Lawrence A. Dubin, ‘‘One-Man Civil Rights Movement,’’ 914 f.
13InterviewwithHarley S.Herman,Hawkins’s historian and attorney, inLeesburg,
Fla. (4 August 1992) (on file with the Florida Law Review); cited in Dubin, p. 916.
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civil rights activism. The emerging social, political, and economic
climate after the war gave energy to the civil rights movement and
inspired hope of reaching its goal of dismantling themost visible symbol
of American racism: Jim Crow.
During the war, many African American leaders advocated victory
abroad and victory at home, connecting America’s war against fascism to
the domestic civil rights struggle. African Americans who had served
overseas returned home having experienced life free of many of the
constraints imposed on them in the South. After the war, the oppression
of blacks, captured in Gunnar Myrdral’s widely read An American
Dilemma, became a national and international embarrassment for the
United States and policy makers in Washington increasingly came to
believe that ending de jure segregation would advance U.S. interests in
the cold war. As legal historianMaryDudziak notes in her analysis of the
connection between coldwar and civil rights politics: ‘‘The thinking that
WorldWar II was a war against racial and religious intolerance, and that
theUnited States stood to gain from promoting equality at homewas so
widespread that Frank Sinatra even sang about it.’’14 The postwar
economic boom raised expectations of social and economic mobility
among Americans, but particularly among African Americans, who
found increasing support for the movement against racism among
white liberals.
A series of blows, some struck by theTruman administration, some
by National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
litigation, and others by grassroots activism, weakened segregation
during the postwar period to give people like Hawkins hope.15 Two
commissions appointed by President Harry Truman powerfully
opposed Jim Crow. Responding to instances in which African
American men and women had been ‘‘killed, maimed, or intimidated,’’
some of whom were returning veterans who had fought overseas,
Truman appointed a President’s Commission on Civil Rights. In
October 1947, its report To Secure These Rights declared ‘‘separate but
equal’’ to be ‘‘one of the outstanding myths of American history for it is
almost always true that while indeed separate, these facilities [to provide
educational, recreational and other public services] are far from equal.’’
The Commission recommended ‘‘the elimination of segregation, based
on race, color, creed, or national origin, from American life.’’16 Truman
14Mary Dudziak, Cold War/Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 9.
15Raymond Arsenault, ‘‘‘You Don’t Have to Ride Jim Crow’: CORE and the 1947
Journey of Reconciliation,’’ in Feldman, Before Brown, 21–67.
16President’s Commission on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights: The Report of the
President’s Committee on Civil Rights. The first quote is fromTruman’s ExecutiveOrder on
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also appointed a commission to address the lack of access to higher
education faced by large segments of the U.S. population. Although the
GI Bill had dramatically expanded access for veterans, people in rural
areas or growing city centers, racial minorities, women, and those who
were not veterans still had limited opportunities. Believing that
confining higher education to an elite would undermine democracy,
seeing an important role for higher education in national security,
individual development, and social mobility, Truman appointed a
commission to lay out a blueprint for the expansion of U.S. higher
education. This commission’s 1947 report, Higher Education for
American Democracy, also denounced segregation. John Thelin
described this report as a turning point in the federal government’s
role in expanding access to higher education by advocating the removal
of geographic, racial and financial barriers to a college education.17
Southerners wrote dissents in both reports arguing that any
desegregation should come about slowly and the federal government
should not interfere in state control of education. In 1948, Truman
issued an executive order desegregating the armed forces, an act that
bolstered blacks’ hopes for dismantling Jim Crow.18
In this political climate the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People’s Legal Defense and Education Fund
(LDF) achieved critical legal victories based on a strategy of proving in
court that segregation was unconstitutional.19 This strategy traces back
December 5, 1946, vii, 81, 166, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/civilrights/srights1. See
also, Richard M. Dalfiume,Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts:
1939–1953 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1969), 137.
17John Thelin, A History of American Higher Education (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2004).
18 During the postwar years, the U.S. Supreme Court also ruled against
segregated schools for Mexican American children in Mendez v. School District of
Orange County (1946) and Delgado v. Bastrop (1948).
19Forworks on the history ofNAACP’s litigation campaign, seeMarkTushnet,The
NAACP’s Legal Strategy against Segregated Education, 1925–1950 (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1987). Tushnet argues that the Legal Defense Fund adjusted its
strategy (shifting from equalization to challenging segregation) based on organization
needs. However, Robert Carter strongly disputes Tushnet’s interpretation, claiming the
organization’s legal strategy ‘‘followed a cohesive, unitary course from Margold to
Marshall’’ with the goal of legal victory declaring segregation unconstitutional and by
so doing may have cost the organization support. See Robert Carter, ‘‘Review: The
NAACP’s Legal Strategy against Segregated Education,’’Michigan Law Review 86, no. 6
(May 1998): 1083–1099. Other books detailing the history of the NAACP campaign
against segregated schools include, Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v.
Board of Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equality (New York: Random House,
1977); Constance Motley, Equal Justice Under the Law (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 1998); James Patterson,Brown v.Board of Education: ACivil RightsMilestone and Its
Troubled Legacy (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press, 2001); JackGreenberg,Crusaders in the
Courts: How a Dedicated Band of Lawyers Fought for the Civil Rights Revolution (New York:
Basic Books, 1994); Robert Rabins, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest
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to Nathan Margold, hired by the NAACP in 1933 to develop a line of
attack against segregation. Margold rejected any legal plan to demand
equal public education facilities (as mandated by Plessy) because ‘‘few
districts would be equalized, soon they would slip back into inequality,
and the struggle would have to start all over again.’’20 Instead Margold
argued for a direct challenge to segregation by using a concept from an
1886 case,YickWo v.Hopkins. In this case, the SupremeCourt ruled a San
Francisco ordinance ‘‘banning laundries in wooden buildings’’
discriminated against Chinese laundries.21 The Courts had never been
asked if segregation as practiced violated the constitution, and Margold
thought that the courts might rule that it did. LDF chief counsel Jack
Greenberg later summarizedMargold’s argument: ‘‘The idea was that if
wherever there was segregation there also was inequality, which was
invariably the case, segregation, therefore, was, unconstitutional.’’22
During the 1930s, NAACP lawyers strategically focused their
challenge to state mandated segregation on graduate and professional
schools because this was where the ‘‘white citadel of school segregation’’
was ‘‘most vulnerable.’’23 Their argument was that denying African
Americans access to graduate and professional programs in white
schools meant denying access to a specific training such as pharmacy
and law unavailable at Historically Black Colleges and Universities
(HBCUs). NAACP attorney Thurgood Marshall wanted to establish a
record that unequivocally demonstrated that inequality resulted from
school segregation.
In the postwar years, the LDF led by Marshall secured several
important victories that should have paved theway for a positive result in
theHawkins case. The courts struck down state proposed alternatives to
desegregation, including out of state scholarships, plans to improve
upon or build new historically black colleges, and racially designated
seating, study tables, and residential facilities within historically white
colleges. Those decisions stipulated several higher-education
obligations of states: a state must offer schooling for African
Americans as soon as it is provided for whites (Sipuel v. Board of
Regents of University of Oklahoma, 1948); black students must receive
the same treatment as white students (MacLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 1950); and a state must provide facilities of comparable quality
(Sweatt v. Painter, 1950). As a result of these cases, the U.S. Supreme
Law (NewYork: American Bar Foundation, 1976). Preer discusses the irony and problem
with basing the argument against segregation on the inferiority of Black schools.
20Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts, 58.
21Ibid., 56.
22Ibid., 59.
23Kluger, Simple Justice, 155.
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court clarified that it was the states’ responsibility to provide qualified
citizenswith access to higher education programswithin its ownborders
and that inequalities existed among colleges and universities with
respect to the quality and the status of their programs.
Both before and after the Hawkins case was filed, legal challenges
integrated universities in a number of states. The LDF secured victories
at several universities, including Maryland (1936), Missouri (1938),
West Virginia (1938), Arkansas (1948), Delaware (1948), Oklahoma
(1948), Kentucky (1949), Louisiana (1950), Texas (1950), Virginia
(1950), and would soon secure victories in North Carolina (1951) and
Tennessee (1952) shortly after the filing. As the first desegregation case
filed in Florida, Hawkins’s suit represented an important challenge in
the Deep South, and a victory in the case would have had far-reaching
consequences. As the statewide higher education governing body, the
Board of Control flatly denied their applications for admission to UF
but offered them scholarships to attend school out of state. After
Hawkins rejected the offer, and the Board of Control realized the case
might go to trial, the board ordered the establishment of a law division at
FAMC. The Board and Attorney General Richard Ervin formulated a
strategy of adding postgraduate programs at FAMC, such as the newLaw
School, in the hope that expanding educational opportunities for African
Americans would undermine the legal campaign against segregation.
After finding that Hawkins met ‘‘all the scholastic, moral and other
qualifications except as to race and color’’ for admission, the Florida
Supreme Court ignored recent precedents set by the U.S. Supreme
Court and denied Hawkins’s petition. Contrary to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s reasoning inGaines v. Canada, the Florida Court’s 1950 decision
accepted the Board of Control’s plan to establish a law school at FAMC
as satisfying the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.24
However, the court did state that until the facilities and operation of
the new law school had been established, Hawkins ‘‘could be given
instruction temporarily at the state institution of higher learning
for white students.’’25 Despite this ruling, the Board of Control
refused to admit Hawkins even temporarily. Hawkins again petitioned
the court to force the university to admit him. The Florida Supreme
Court ruled that Hawkins failed to re-apply to UF and brought no
evidence that the state was not providing a comparable education at
the black college. After reapplying and putting forth arguments that the
new Law School at FAMC was an ‘‘organization on paper,’’ Hawkins
24State ex rel.Hawkins v Board of Control of Florida et al., 47 So. 2d 608, 609, 708; 1950
Fla. Lexis 1052.
25Ibid.
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tried again.26However, the Florida SupremeCourt ruled that the Board
ofControl had fulfilled its constitutional duty by creating a law school at
FAMC.27Hawkins andLDFattorneyRobertCarter then requested that
the United States Supreme Court review the decision.
Aweek following their decision in Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court
vacated the Florida’s SupremeCourt’s ruling inHawkins, remanding the
case back ‘‘for consideration in light of the Segregation Cases decided
May 17, 1954, Brown v. Board of Educationy that now prevail.’’28 This
ruling that Brown applied to higher education should have led to quick
victory for Hawkins. LDF attorney Constance Motley took over
Hawkins’s case. In her book Equal Justice under the Law, the civil-rights
attorney who was later a federal judge recalls appearing before ‘‘a group
of stone-faced white male justices’’ in what she describes as ‘‘our (LDF)
first brush with massive resistance.’’29 She had in mind not the violent
terrorism, the shooting, beatings, and cross burnings of the radical right
but the coordinated efforts of officials at all levels of state government to
resist even token desegregation. Florida officials continued to resist
Hawkins’s admission to UF, unabashedly circumventing U.S. Supreme
Court rulings that he be admitted. Eventually, as we discuss later,
Hawkins agreed to withdraw his application in exchange for UF being
opened up to other African American students.
Brown did not end discrimination against African Americans in
higher education admissions to colleges and universities established for
whites, despite the U.S. Supreme Court ruling that Brown prevailed in
higher education as well as public schools. Instead, Hawkins
demonstrated the limits of Brown as the Florida State Court and
Board of Control continued to refuse admission of African Americans
to the UF for four years after the landmark decision. The resistance to
even token desegregation in Florida paralleled actions in other states in
the Deep South. African Americans did not attend historically white
institutions in Georgia until 1961, in Mississippi until 1962, Alabama
and South Carolina until 1963, although Aurtherine Lucy briefly
attended the University of Alabama in 1956 before being expelled. As
explained by Peter Wallenstein, higher education desegregation was an
uneven process. All southern states resisted it; and some such as Florida
were more stubborn than others, refusing to admit an African American
26Algia Copper, ‘‘Brown v. Board of Education and Virgil Darnell Hawkins
Twenty-Eight Years and Six Petitions to Justice,’’ The Journal of Negro History 64
(1979): 1–20.
27Joseph A. Tomberlin, ‘‘The Negro and Florida’s System of Education: The
Aftermath of the Brown Case’’ (Florida Sate University, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1967), 154.
28Hawkins et al. v. Board of Control of Florida et al., 347 U.S. 971; 74 S. Ct. 783; 98 L.
Ed. 1112; 1954 U.S. LEXIS 2047; Motley, Equal Justice, 112, 113.
29Ibid., 113.
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until 1958.30 In Florida, Maryland, Arkansas, and Tennessee,
Wallenstein notes that the enrollment of ‘‘black students in graduate
and professional programs predated undergraduates by at least four
years.’’31 Yet, violent white protests did not surround higher education
desegregation as it did the desegregation of public elementary and high
schools, a public peace suggesting the ‘‘drama was of a far more subtle
sort.’’32 The next section explores the subtle and not so subtle ways
Florida’s political and educational leaders attempted to divert the
desegregation of higher education.
Florida’s Response to Brown: Resistance and Expansion of
Segregated Public Higher Education
WhenBrownwas handed down in 1954, Florida had yet to admit a single
African American to a white university. This was the result of a
determined effort by governors, the Board of Control, legislators, and
judges to preserve segregation. The year before, while Brown was
pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Board of Control acted
on the belief that it might be vulnerable to further litigation like
Hawkins’s under the ‘‘separate but equal’’ doctrine. The board
designated FAMC a university, changed its name to Florida
Agricultural and Mechanical University (FAMU), and authorized a
pharmacy program. Once the court rendered its decision, white
politicians and government officials adopted a complex strategy of
30Tomberlin, ‘‘Florida and the Desegregation Issue,’’ 457–467.
31Peter Wallenstein, ‘‘Black Southerners and Non-Black Universities:
Desegregating Higher Education 1935–1967,’’ History of Higher Education Annual 19
(1999): 121–148, 142. Wallenstein provides a critical look at desegregation in higher
education to suggest directions for future historical research. Wallenstein concludes in
the seventeen states desegregationwas initially prompted by court order at one institution
before the state adopted ‘‘less exclusive racial policy at other schools’’ (127). For a recent
history of desegregation of higher education in Texas, see Amilcar Shabazz, Advancing
Democracy: African Americans and the Struggle for Access and Equity in Higher Education in
Texas (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). Shabazz argued that
advocates of ‘‘liberal integrationism’’ (borrowing a term from Manning Marable)
overcame the ‘‘legal barriers’’ to access to higher education. Commenting on the
limited history of desegregation in higher education, Shabazz suggest historians might
be reluctant to write about the topic because: (1) higher desegregation is still in process;
and (2) historians may also be reluctant to blemish the reputations of key actors who are
still living or institutions in which they work. Also see Dwonna Naomi Goldstone,
Integrating the 40 Acres: The Fifty-year Struggle for Racial Equality at the University of Texas
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006); and Reginald Irwin DeWitty, ‘‘Ada Lois
Sipuel and the Desegregation of Higher Education in Oklahoma: A Prelude to Brown’’
(University of South Florida, M.A. Thesis, 1992).
32Wallenstein, 142. See Statistical Summary of School Segregation-Desegregation in the
Southern and Boarder States, 1966–1967 (Nashville: Southern Education Reporting
Service, 1967).
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threatening black institutions at the same time they were creating new
segregated institutions. They threatened to establish statewide
admissions standards that would exclude nearly all blacks from FAMU
without appreciably opening up thewhite schools, and they implied that
FAMUmight be closed. Legislators, theBoard ofControl, and Supreme
Court justices thus defined ‘‘access’’ in a way that presented African
Americans with a Hobson’s choice between strengthening segregated
black institutions or a dramatic reduction in opportunities for blacks if
they continued to press for desegregation.
On the day following theBrown decision, ActingGovernorCharlie
Johns met with the cabinet.33 Arch segregationists such as the openly
racist JohnsFwho had been president of the state senate and became
Acting Governor when Governor Daniel T. McCarty died in office in
fall 1953Frefused to make concessions, promoted Mississippi-style
interposition, and favored coercion as the best strategy to defeat
integration. Within state government, discourse was confined to
determining the best way to preserve segregation. Racial liberals who
advocated equality and an end to segregation in the foreseeable future
were excluded from government positions. Moderates constituted the
only real opposition within the state to the arch segregationists. Led by
Attorney General Richard Ervin, State Superintendent of Public
Instruction Thomas Bailey, and State Senator LeRoy Collins,
moderates could countenance gradual integration in the distant future
and favored ‘‘legal’’ means to avoid implementing Brown in the
meantime. Thus, the moderates were ‘‘moderate segregationists’’
rather than advocates of integration, but they rejected the violence
advocated by arch segregationists. The moderates had wide support
among business people. As tourism replaced agriculture as the engine
driving the economy, Florida promoters sought to create an image of a
‘‘moderate’’ state to distinguish it from other warm weather southern
states where race relations remained more volatile.34 The cabinet
decided that the state should respond to Brown by having Attorney
General Ervin prepare a brief for the Supreme Court hearing on
implementation of its order, a victory for the moderates.35 Collins
defeated Johns in a special election in the fall and took office January 4,
33Tomberlin, ‘‘Negro andFlorida’s System,’’ 48.The executive branch in Florida in
the 1950s consisted of the Secretary of State, Attorney General, Comptroller, Treasurer,
Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Commissioner of Agriculture, each
independently elected.
34Arthur O. White, Florida’s Crisis in Public Education: Changing Patterns of
Leadership (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1975).
35Ibid., 49.
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1955. By the time Ervin presented his brief in April, the moderate
segregationists were firmly in control of Florida’s racial policy.
Along with attorneys representing five other southern statesF
Arkansas, Maryland, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and TexasFErvin
presented briefs to the Supreme Court. Ervin’s ‘‘extensive and spirited’’
brief reveals that the statewas using a similar rationale to denyHawkins’s
admission to law school and to evade Brown.36 Rather than denouncing
Brown, Ervin argued that immediate desegregation would result in
violence. To bolster his argument, Ervin reported findings of a state
funded study on attitudes toward desegregation, showing, he claimed,
that most Floridians including law enforcement officers would actively
resist any efforts to desegregate public education.37 Citing the findings
of the state survey, Ervin called for a gradual process of desegregation
without any deadlines.38
In Brown II, the Supreme Court refrained from setting any
deadlines for desegregation. The Brown II ruling gave responsibility
for desegregating public schools to local districts, not the states. The
court remanded the segregation cases to federal district court justices,
who ‘‘because of their proximity to local conditions’’ could ‘‘best
perform this judicial appraisal.’’39 Segregationist legislators believed
that the court’s decree in Brown II did not pose an ‘‘immediate threat to
the tradition of segregated schools.’’ Representative Prentice Pruitt of
Jefferson County summarized the language of the decree as requiring
that desegregation should occur ‘‘as soon as feasible’’ and stated, ‘‘It may
be feasible in Florida in the next 50 or 100 years. No one would say it’s
feasible now.’’40
The Florida Board of Control and legislators believed Brown II
reinforced their argument for refusing Hawkins’s admission despite the
U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling that Brown would prevail in higher
education cases. Using the same strategy presented by Ervin, they
cited existing local attitudes and the need for further study as reasons
to delay. The Florida Supreme Court agreed. Citing Brown II, the
Florida court ruled that although the UF could not refuse Hawkins’s
admission because of his race, the Board of Control could do so on the
grounds that his presence would cause campus disruption. To decide
when might be a feasible time to admit Hawkins, the Court appointed
36Kluger, Simple Justice, 724.
37White, Florida’s Crisis in Public Education, 50.
38Tomberlin, ‘‘Negro and Florida’s System,’’ 75.
39Kluger, Simple Justice, 744.
40Herbert Cameron, ‘‘Florida Officials Express General Relief on Terms of
Desegregation Ruling,’’ Tampa Morning Tribune, 1 June 1955.
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Circuit Judge John Murphree to ‘‘gather testimony from Hawkins, the
Board of Control, and other interested parties.’’41
Though not unanimous, the 1955 Florida Supreme Court’s
decision in Hawkins reflected white segregationists’ outrage with the
Brown ruling. The concurring opinion of JusticeWilliamGlenn Terrell
spoke loudly to what civil rights leaders were up against in Florida and
the convoluted logic that would make desegregation a threat to FAMU.
After discussing the problems and costs associated with moving from a
segregated to a non-segregated system, Terrell asked rhetorically what
the U.S. Supreme Court’s mandate of ‘‘equitable principles
characterized by practicable flexibility’’ may mean for Florida State
University and FAMU: ‘‘does desegregation mean that attendance at
these institutions is to be scrambled and one of them abandoned and the
other enlarged at great expense in order that whites and Negroes may
attend the new school? A negative answer to this question would appear
to be evident.’’42 Then Justice Terrell continued:
. . . and when God created man, he allotted each race to his own continent
according to color, Europe to the white man, Asia to the yellow man, Africa
to the black man, and America to the red man, but we are now advised that
God’s plan was in error and must be reversed despite the fact that gregar-
iousness has been the law of the various species of the animal kingdom.43
Although the moderates who had taken control of the executive
branch rejected Terrell’s suggestion that desegregation went against
‘‘God’s plan,’’ this belief was typical of southern segregationists. While
this belief led Terrell to reject a plan to ‘‘scramble’’ white and black
students by closing FAMU, he hinted at the potential threat
desegregation held for HBCUs.
Floridians would understand the hint to black institutions because
they hadwitnessed other states respond to desegregation in this way. For
instance, when the University of Louisville opened its doors to African
American applicants at the graduate and undergraduate levels in 1950
and 1951, respectively, the Board of Trustees closed Louisville
Municipal College for Negroes. However, only fifty-five of the 146
African American students eligible for the LouisvilleMunicipal College
enrolled at the University of Louisville. There was a 70 percent decline
in African American high school graduates continuing on to college in
the subsequent year. Furthermore, all but one of the African American
41Tomberlin, ‘‘Florida and the School Desegregation Issue,’’ 464.
42State of Florida, ex rel. Virgil D. Hawkins v Board of Control, 83 So. 2d 20; Oct. 19,
1955; Fla. Lexis 4002.
43Ibid., also cited in Motley, Equal Justice Under the Law.
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faculty members at the Municipal College lost their jobs.44 As historian
Jean Preer argues, the higher education cases revealed a ‘‘paradox’’;
namely, ‘‘efforts to further legal equality might threaten educational
opportunities for Black students and Black colleges.’’45
In addition toMurphree’s court-ordered inquiry, Florida’s Board of
Control compiled a study based on a survey of parents, faculty, students,
and alumni associated with the three state universities. The study also
surveyed the facilities of the three institutions. Survey results indicated a
variety of problems that could result from desegregation; however, they
also revealed that only a minority of white Floridians strongly opposed
desegregation, implying that moderates like Ervin exaggerated the
potential for a disruptive response from whites. For instance, of the
white students surveyed at UF and FSU, only 21 percent believed
African Americans should not be admitted ‘‘under any circumstances,’’
and only 1.6 and 14.9 percent, respectively, said they would drop out or
transfer to a segregated college if African Americans were admitted.46
White parents and alumniweremore opposed to desegregation, with 35
percent of parents indicating they would transfer their child to another
institution if FSU orUF desegregated, and 33 percent of alumni stating
they would stop supporting their alma mater if it desegregated.47White
parents of high school seniors expressed the most negative attitudes
toward desegregation. FAMU students expressed highly positive
attitudes toward desegregation with 96 percent indicating that they
would not object to non-African Americans attending the university.48
In addition, nearly 90 percent of parents of FAMU students did not
object towhite students attending their children’s school. And, finally 92
percent of FAMUalumni indicated theywould continue to support their
44Motley, 97.
45For instance, the UNC case fell apart when the president of the plaintiff’s
historically Black almamater refused to supply a letter of recommendation or transcript as
proof of the scholastic achievement necessary to enter UNC’s School of Pharmacy. Dr.
James Shepard, president of North Carolina Colleges of Negroes, understood that his
institution’s as well as his own status depended on the very state legislators who opposed
integration. Jean L. Preer, Lawyers v. Educators: Black Colleges and Desegregation in Public
Higher Education (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982). In fact, Bell argues the civil
rights movement contributed to the devaluation of these institutions in the higher
education litigation; see Derrick Bell, ‘‘Brown and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,’’
in Shades of Brown: New Perspectives on School Desegregation, ed. Derrick Bell (New York:
Teachers College Press, 1980), pp. 90–106. For a more recent discussion of this paradox,
see Albert L. Samuels, Is Separate Unequal? Black Colleges and the Challenge to Desegregation
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004).
46Study of Desegregation, Tallahassee: Board of Control for State Institutions of
Higher Learning, May 1956, 4.
47Ibid., 7, 11.
48Ibid., 13.
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alma mater if whites enrolled.49 Judged in light of these findings,
Attorney General Ervin’s and the court-appointed Murphree’s claims
that Hawkins’s admission would cause public chaos were
exaggerations.50
In 1957, Florida’s Supreme Court issued its final ruling against
Hawkins. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts accepted
Ervin’s exaggerations and argued that evidence from local studies
revealed that ‘‘enforced integration’’ would result in a great ‘‘loss of
revenue to our white state institutions.’’ Roberts reasoned this financial
cost would result from the withdrawal of white students and financial
support from grants and alumni groups. In addition, he stated,
‘‘Integration would unquestionably result in the abandonment of
substantially all of the graduate work’’ at FAMU because it would be
an ‘‘unnecessary duplication’’ of programs at FSUandUF.51Roberts did
not seem to consider the possibility that graduate programs could have
been eliminated from the other institutions or shared.
Following this ruling, Hawkins returned to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Refusing to review the case, the Court recommended the
petitioner ‘‘seek relief’’ in ‘‘an appropriate United States District
Court.’’52 Constance Motley explained the Court’s decision:
The Supreme Court did this because it had no apparatus for enforcing its
own decision, which is why an oath to uphold theConstitution is required by
every state official. Under the Constitutions, the President of the United
States has the responsibility to enforce the law, which includes Supreme
Court decisions. Obviously hoping to avoid a federal-state crisis in 1957 in a
state with a large segment of its population unopposed to integration at the
university level, the Supreme Court suggested we (LDF) bring the suit in a
federal district court overwhich it had supervisory jurisdiction, thus avoiding
a constitutional crisis over state resistance.53
Given that a month earlier President Eisenhower had ordered
federal troops to escort nine school children intoCentralHighSchool in
Little Rock, Arkansas, Motley assumed that the Court wanted to avoid
another direct conflict with a state government.
49Ibid., 16.
50Samuel Selkow, ‘‘Hawkins, The United States Supreme Court and Justice,’’ The
Journal of Negro Education 31 (1962): 97–101. For similar exaggerations by moderates in
NorthCarolina, seeWilliamChafe,Civilities and Civil Rights: North Carolina and the Black
Struggle for Equality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).
51Hawkins v. Board of Control, 93 So. 2d 354; 1957 Fla. Lexis 3732.
52Florida Ex rel. Hawkins v Board of Control, 355 U.S. 839; 78 S. Ct. 20; 2 L. Ed. 2d
49; 1957 U.S. Lexis 482.
53Motley, 116.
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The Florida Supreme Court’s defiance in theHawkins case showed
the limits of the power of theUnited States SupremeCourt.54 Following
the U.S. Supreme Court’s recommendation, LDF filed on behalf of
Hawkins and other African Americans in a federal district court.
However, Florida native and district court judge Dozier DeVane was a
staunch segregationist. Motley notes that Judge DeVane initially
‘‘refused to hear the case, which we were now bringing as a class
action.’’ Motley recalls appearing before DeVane:
He ruled that he would set the case down for trial at a later time. He then
proceeded to lecture me on all he done to help ‘‘your people in Florida.’’ He
said, ‘‘Iwas on the committee that set upFloridaA&Mfor your people.What
are we going to do with that college?’’55
Here again, a Florida judge suggested desegregation could result in
the demise of FAMU. Ultimately, Motley secured an order from the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to force DeVane to hear the case.
DeVane issuedanorder that recognized the rightofqualifiedAfrican
Americans to attend the University, but ignoring earlier rulings to the
contrary, he refusedHawkins’s admission on the grounds that he was not
qualified, because his score on the Law School Admission Test (LSAT)
was lower thanUF’s recently implemented requirement.56 In 1949, when
Hawkins originally applied for admission, the Board of Control did not
require LSATscores. In 1956, Hawkins took the test, scoring 200.57 On
May 16, 1958, the Board of Control adopted a minimum score of 250 for
any applicant taking the test before 1958 and aminimum score of 350 for
any future applicant. Hawkins agreed to withdraw his application on the
condition that other qualified African Americans would be admitted to
UF. According to Motley, both the state and LDF ‘‘consciously
overlooked’’ the legal problems with DeVane’s ‘‘bizarre ruling’’ to admit
other African American students but not the plaintiff so that a deal could
be worked out.58 In 1958, when George H. Starke qualified and was
admitted to the UF’s Law School, no public disruption ensued.59
Hawkins exemplifies how Florida officials threatened to withhold
educational opportunities if African Americans sought access to white
institutions. As R. Scott Barker has documented, adopting seemingly
54Algia R. Cooper, ‘‘Brown v. Board of Education and Virgil Darnell Hawkins:
Twenty-Eight Years and Six Petitions to Justice,’’ Journal of Negro History 64 (1979):
1–20.
55Motley, 116.
56Ibid.
57Selkow, ‘‘Hawkins,’’ 99.
58Motley, 116.
59Selkow, 101.
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race neutral criteria for admissions such as standardized tests was used to
thwartAfricanAmericans’ educational advancement.60 Before using this
technique to denyHawkins entrance to law school, theBoard ofControl
sought to use admission standards to deny blacks admission to
undergraduate programs. Partly as a strategy to address increasing
demand for higher education, in March of 1956, the Florida Board of
Control developed proposed standards and procedures to make
university admissions more selective. However, it proposed two options
Fone if segregation continued, anotherwithmore stringent criteria if it
did not. The Board approved criteria in which a student could be
admitted to a university if their scores on Florida’s Twelfth Grade Test
‘‘place them above the scores attained by the lowest eight percent of
freshmen admitted in September 1955, to the university at which
admission is sought.’’61 However, the Board of Control recommended
that ‘‘if integration is required,’’ the State Board of Education should set
a single standard for admissions to all three universities. According to
the ‘‘Study onDesegregation,’’ the Board of Control recommended that
seniors be required to score above the fiftieth percentile on Florida State
twelve Grade tests to be eligible for admission. The staff of the Board of
Control speculated that if the Office of Education follows this
recommendation, only 5.6 percent of African American high school
seniors would be ‘‘eligible to matriculate at any State university,
including Florida A and M University.’’62 In fact, they predicted that
only 250 African American seniors would be eligible to attend a
university, a sharp decline from the 800 students who had been
enrolled to FAMU the previous year.
Led by Governor Collins, Attorney General Ervin, and State
Superintendent of Public Instruction Thomas Bailey, moderate
segregationists advocated what could be called a ‘‘carrot and stick’’
approach, on the one hand offering African Americans increased
opportunities within segregation if they would moderate their demand
for immediate integration, and on the other hand threatening black
institutions if they persisted. One of the ‘‘carrots’’ was the development
of black junior colleges to increase postsecondary education
opportunities. The biggest ‘‘stick,’’ however, was the threat to close
black institutions, particularly FAMU, without affording significant
opportunity at the white universities. As suggested in Ervin’s
Brown II brief, smaller ‘‘sticks’’ included reducing scholarships for
60R. Scott Baker, Paradoxes of Desegregation: African American Struggles for
Educational Equity in Charleston, South Carolina, 1926–1972 (Columbia: University of
South Carolina Press, 2006).
61Study of Desegregation, Appendix D, 1.
62Ibid., 28.
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African Americans or eliminating duplicative programs at FAMU.
Throughout the early 1960s, this strategy guided moderate
segregationists’ response to African Americans’ demand for higher
education desegregation.
Governor Collins had become a supporter of junior colleges while
serving in the Senate. In 1947, the year Higher Education for American
Democracy was published, Governor Millard F. Caldwell appointed a
citizens commission to recommend ways the state could respond to
explosive growth in college enrollment anticipated over the next several
decades for both whites and blacks. UF graduate student James
Wattenbarger recommended establishing publicly funded junior
colleges, a number for whites and a few for blacks. Wattenbarger had
been hired by the commission, and Senator Collins included
Wattenbarger’s recommendation in the Florida Minimum Foundation
Lawpassed that year, ostensibly to equalize funding across public school
districts.63
Despite the new law, public interest in two-year colleges was
limited. During the first eight years after its passage, one existing
public college and two formerly private colleges took advantage of
this new source of state funding, and only two new colleges were
established. The two new colleges were both in Pensacola, where
whites had successfully lobbied for a school in 1948 and blacks
campaigned to get their own school the following year. Washington
Junior College, the black school, was located in a segregated high
school. After these, no new community colleges were created in Florida
until 1957.
After establishing a junior college in Pensacola, blacks did not press
for additional segregated junior colleges. Some communities accepted
them quietly; others protested the creation of yet another segregated
system. Individual black students tried to desegregate white colleges. In
the fall of 1954, inspired by the Brown decision, two young men who
were co-valedictorians of Gibbs High School for African Americans
attempted to enroll in St. Petersburg Junior College (SPJC). Their
applications were rejected. Bailey and Ervin argued that the U.S.
Supreme Court had not issued an implementation decree and the
63Governor’s Citizens’ Committee on Education, Education and the Future of
Florida: A Report of the Comprehensive Study of Education in Florida (Tallahassee, 1947)
http://fulltext10.fcla.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=fhp&idno=CF00001663&format=pdf;
Wattenbarger, State Plan;Wattenbarger,TheCommunity Junior College in Florida’s Future:
The Report to the State Board of Education by the Community College Council 1957
(Tallahassee, FL: Florida State Department of Education, 1957). On the Minimum
Foundation Law, see Sherman Dorn and Deanna Michael, ‘‘Education Finance Reform
in Florida,’’ inEducation Reform in Florida: Diversity and Equity in Public Policy, ed. Kathryn
Borman&ShermanDorn (Albany: StateUniversity ofNewYorkPress, 2007), pp. 53–82.
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Florida Constitution required segregation. The school board’s attorney
cited a New Jersey black newspaper editor who cautioned that ‘‘forced
integration’’ would result in the dismissal of public school teachers. This
argument shows howmoderate segregationists used threats, as itwas not
clear why desegregating a white junior college would lead to this
consequence. The following year, when a young woman who had
been valedictorian at Gibbs applied for admission to SPJC, her
application was rejected.64
The year 1955 was pivotal in Florida race relations and in the
development of a community college system. Three key events took
place that year. The first was Collins’s election. Collins, in office from
1955 to 1961, became the first governor to be re-elected under a state
constitution that limited governors to one full term. Throughout his
administration, he pushed the junior college agenda. Second, the
presidents of the UF and Florida State University adopted a policy in
line with the Governor’s. When the Florida Supreme Court ruled that
Virgil Hawkins be admitted to the University of Florida Law School,
acting as the Inter-Institutional Council, a group that excluded the
president of FAMU, the presidents of the two white universities,
resolved to follow a policy of gradualism and to do everything legally
possible to delay integration.65 Third, Superintendent Bailey persuaded
the Board of Control to appoint Community College Council to study
how community or junior colleges might be used to meet the growing
demand for higher education. The council hired JamesWattenbarger as
its first director. Although thenameand functionof the council changed,
Wattenbarger served as director until 1967.
With some additional information on student and community
interests,Wattenbarger’s 1953 dissertation,AState Plan for Public Junior
Colleges, with Special Reference to Florida, became the official master plan
for a statewide community college system.Wattenbarger acknowledged
his debt to the Truman Commission and said many years later that
Florida had gone further than any other state in implementing its vision.
Other than calling for a dual system, the inspiration is apparent. Like
those proposed by the commission and national organization such as the
American Association of Junior Colleges, the colleges he proposed
would provide transfer and vocational programs but would emphasize
the latter, even though Wattenbarger’s own surveys showed that
64Arthur O.White, ‘‘The Desegregation of Florida’s Public Junior Colleges,’’ 31–
36.
65Minutes, Inter-Institutional Committee, Sunday, 30 October 1955, pp. 2 f., RG
440 S728, Box 1, Board of Regents, Council of Presidents Documents, Florida State
Archives.
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students in Florida like their national counterparts clearly wanted
four-year degrees.66
Once Wattenbarger’s plan became official policy in 1957,
community college building began in earnest. By 1962, there were
twelve junior colleges for African Americans and seventeen for white
Americans. In Dade County, African Americans protested the creation
of a segregated college. The local school board compromised by
establishing a black campus as a branch of a white college. While the
white colleges had their own facilities, nearly all of the black schools
were located in a segregated high school. A year after Collins left office,
the establishing of black colleges ended. AsCollins’s successor, C. Farris
Bryantwasmore openly segregationist and ranon aplatformof reducing
taxes.
Under increasing pressure to desegregate the white universities,
moderate segregationists ignored blacks’ court victories requiring the
end of the separate but equal principle and began to make separate
education more equal, at least superficially. The steps they took in that
direction were modest. The black colleges had vastly inferior facilities
and very limited programs compared with the white colleges. Some of
the schools were likely too small to offer fully developed programs.
Roosevelt JuniorCollege in PalmBeach had seventy-three students, and
Collier-Blocker Junior College in Palatka had only sixty-one.While the
white colleges offered a range of technical programs, according to one
study, the black schools had ‘‘limited terminal programs which tend to
perpetuate job placements in low level positions and which offer no
opportunities for Negro youth to break into the newly opened fields of
technology.’’67 Thus, the new colleges were certainly separate from the
white colleges, but they were far from equal.
The problemwas not simply that the South was moving too slowly
to dismantle JimCrow, as though it were simply amatter of overcoming
friction to get things rolling. Rather, as the Florida case shows, the real
problem was that state leaders actively worked to preserve segregation
and consciously defied U.S. Supreme Court orders to end segregation.
The state’s response in Hawkins was not the only act of defiance. The
creation of a segregated junior college system from scratch flew in the
face of Brown. Even the moderate segregationists’ rationale that they
could evade Brown ‘‘legally’’ must be seen as defiance; they were flouting
66Governor’s Citizens’ Committee on Education, Education and the Future of
Florida: A Report of the Comprehensive Study of Education in Florida (Tallahassee, 1947)
http://fulltext10.fcla.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=fhp&idno=CF00001663&format=pdf;
James L. Wattenbarger, A State Plan; and Wattenbarger, The Community Junior College.
67Carroll L. Miller, ‘‘The Negro Publicly-Supported Junior College,’’ The Journal
of Negro Education 31 (1962): 386–395.
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what had become the ‘‘supreme law of the Land.’’68 The state
also opened a new university for whites only in 1960, the University of
South Florida. Delay and defiance called for new tools to get real
movement on desegregation. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 included
levers meant to move the rock of segregation. Most telling, Title VI of
the act included authority to withhold federal funds from states that did
not desegregate.
Florida’s Response to the 1964 Civil Rights Act: Threatening the
Future of black Institutions
African Americans used the Civil Rights Act (CRA) to ratchet up the
pressure to desegregate higher education. Florida whites responded by
attacking black institutions. The Board of Control, local school boards,
and the state department of education concocted arguments that the
CRA required the desegregation or closure of black institutions.69 State
University System Chancellor Broward J. Culpepper announced that
unless the state acted quickly to desegregate FAMUHospital, the State
University System could lose $30 million in federal funding, quite an
astonishing claim as the federal government had not begun the lengthy
administrative procedures required by the CRA before funds could be
withheld.70 Florida officials who had argued for decades that separate
was in fact equal suddenly discovered irreparable dilapidation and
irredeemable inferiority in black facilities.71 Their solution was not to
fix those facilities but to close them.Within four years, they closed all of
the black junior colleges, theFAMUhospital, and theFAMUlaw school,
claiming that desegregation required the elimination of the separate
facilities. Blacks’ argument that desegregation did not require the loss of
black institutions had little effect, and in the end blacks had fewer
educationalFand health careFopportunities.72 The precipitous
closing of the junior colleges following passage of the CRA shows that
the moderate segregationists’ claim to need time to plan a smooth
transition to a unitary system and avoid disruption wasmerely a ploy. By
the end of 1967, the state and local school districts that had governing
authority over the two-year colleges closed all of the black junior
68U.S. Constitution, Article VI.
69Rabby,ThePain and the Promise: The Struggle for Civil Rights inTallahassee (Athens:
The University of Georgia Press, 1999), 187 f.;Walter L. Smith, TheMagnificent Twelve:
Florida’s Black Junior Colleges (Winter Park, FL: Four G Publishers, 1994).
70Rabby,ThePain and the Promise, 187.Culpepper served as director of theBoard of
Control during the 1950s and early 1960s, overseeing its activities in the Hawkins case
and developing the policy of gradualism adopted by the President’s Council in 1955.
71Ibid.
72Ibid., for discussion of the closure of FAMUHospital.
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colleges and merged them with nearby white community colleges.
African Americans bore the brunt of the mergers. Although
enrollment in some of the black junior colleges had been declining
since 1961, the mergers sent enrollments plummeting. Although open
enrollment policies are typical of community colleges, Florida’s white
colleges adopted entrance tests and set cutoff scores ‘‘just high enough to
eliminate the vast majority of nonwhite students.’’73 In five districts
where there had been 2,000 black students in 1964, there were only 500
in 1968.Many black administrators and faculty also lost their jobs in this
form of ‘‘desegregation.’’ However, a few districts avoided these
problems. Polk and Miami-Dade Junior Colleges increased black
enrollment after desegregating, and in Volusia County, community
members who had opposed the creation of a segregated college
protested to keep it open to ensure the faculty and administrators did
not lose their jobs. Their protest forced the white college to hire the
president, though in a lower position, and assist faculty in finding jobs.
But for most, the closing of black institutions meant the loss of
jobs, weakened black leadership, and decreasing numbers of black
students served.74 Had white state officials been planning how to
desegregate in a serious fashion, they could have expanded blacks’
opportunities immediately, as careful planning in Polk and Miami did.
Instead, those white officials spent their time planning how to avoid
desegregation. Faced with mounting pressure, they chose to
‘‘desegregate’’ in ways that undercut blacks’ opportunities and
disrupted their educational plans.
Florida officials did not follow the desegregation of the two-year
colleges with immediate desegregation of four-year universities.
Instead, resistance to desegregation depended on the prestige of the
institution. African Americans had more success gaining admission to
the University of South Florida (USF) than to UF or Florida State.
While the latter two schools traced their roots to the nineteenth century,
USF was established in 1956 and opened to students in 1960. The new
university did not have a tradition rooted in segregation, did not have
time to build up strong relationships with legislators, and lacked a
network of white alumni. Consequently, it was more open to black
students than the older, more prestigious, and more politically potent
universities, though this fact did not mean that black students were
treated well after being admitted toUSF. AlthoughUF admitted a black
student to law school in 1958, it did not graduate an African American
73Ansley A. Abrahams and Gertrude L. Simmons, ‘‘The Educational Outlook for
Nonwhites in Florida,’’ The Journal of Negro Education 35 (1966): 369–380, 377.
74White, ‘‘Desegregation of Florida’s Public Junior Colleges,’’ 35.
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undergraduate until 1965, tying with the University of Alabama as the
last ‘‘flagship’’ state university to do so.75
Florida officials made only minimal gestures to desegregate the
state’s white universities for many years, despite persistent legal efforts
by the NAACP to increase access to them. Instead, they became
preoccupied with FAMU, arguing like other white southern policy
makers that compliance with desegregation orders required the
integration or dismantling of black colleges and universities. For a
number of years, governors, legislators, and the Board ofControl and its
successor Board of Regents floated proposals to close FAMU, merge it
with historically white Florida State University, or reduce its status,
possibly converting it to a two-year school.76 Proposals tomerge FAMU
with FSU persisted for a decade but were eventually dropped. For
example, proposals to reduce the scope of programs like confining
FAMU to undergraduate education began to surface soon after FAMU
acquired its first postgraduate programs in the 1950s andhave continued
to surface periodically.77 Although the most damaging proposals have
not been implemented, and the campus retains its university status, the
law school was closed four years after passage of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.
The idea of closing the law school surfaced in the 1950s, broached
by Florida Supreme Court Justice B. K. Roberts, who wrote the 1957
opinion denying Hawkins admission to UF. By 1959, the year after
Hawkins withdrew his application, moderate segregationist Governor
Collins came to the conclusion that segregated graduate and
professional schools were illegal and wasteful. He argued that the
state could save money by integrating some graduate programs.78
Arch segregationists made a show of defending the law school. North
Florida Senator Wilson Carraway urged increased support to
strengthen and expand the law school so ‘‘there would be no demand
for integration.’’ House Speaker Tom Beasley countered Collins’s
argument that integration of costly graduate programs was merely
fiscally sound policy by claiming that ‘‘the people are willing to pay
whatever is necessary to maintain segregation.’’79
In 1963, the Board of Control ‘‘discovered’’ an increased need for
lawyers in the state and authorized public universities to submit
75Robert Bruce Slater, ‘‘The First Black Graduates of the Nation’s 50 Flagship
State Universities,’’ The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education 13 (1996): 72–85, 74.
76John Egerton, The Black Public Colleges, Integration and Disintegration (Nashville:
Race Relations Institute, 1971).
77Johnson and Borman, ‘‘Competing Ideals of University Governance;’’ Rabby,
The Pain and the Promise.
78Rabby, The Pain and the Promise, 188.
79Ibid., 189.
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proposals to meet the demand.80 UF and FSU each submitted a
proposal, but FAMU did not. Though FSU’s campus is less than two
miles from FAMU, it proposed to establish a new ‘‘law center’’ with a
maximum enrollment of 1,200 students, ‘‘with planning funds available
in April, 1965, and classes beginning in September, 1968.’’81 By themid-
1960s, Carraway and other more extreme segregationists had joined the
moderate segregationists. ‘‘[T]he board of control and the state’s white
politiciansFonce committed to keeping black students out of theUF at
any costFwere now committed to closing down theFAMULawSchool
and opening a new one at Florida State University.’’82 Carraway
sponsored legislation in 1965 providing funds to plan a law school at
FSU. As the successor of the Board of Control, the newFlorida Board of
Regents released the funds to FSU. The next year the regents decided
FAMU would not accept any new law students.
One historian of the civil rightsmovement inTallahassee called the
FAMU law school ‘‘small but reputable;’’ however, the underfunded and
understaffed program remained vulnerable to criticism throughout its
existence. Critics pointed out that between 1951 and 1963, only thirty-
two students had graduated from the law school, only twenty-one of
whom had passed the bar in Florida or another state. Twenty-five more
students would graduate by the time the school closed. Law School
DeanThomasM. Jenkins, with the support of the black community, the
Tallahassee Businessman’s LeagueFthe African American counterpart
to the white Chamber of CommerceFand the Inter-Civic Council,
representing ministers, business people, and professionals and led by
veteran civil rights activist Charles Kenzie (C. K.) Steele, mobilized
broad support for the college. Defenders argued that despite the lack of
money and other support from the state, the school met an essential
need. Graduates had become community leaders and represented
African Americans who desperately needed it. They feared that white
law schoolswould not be hospitable to blacks andwould not focus on the
needs of the black community. Civil rights activist and attorney John
Due argued that few blacks would be able to meet admissions criteria at
UF or FSU and thus would be denied an opportunity to obtain legal
education.83 Their mobilization was not sufficient to stop the white
coalition’s plan; the last group of students graduated in 1968, andFAMU
law school closed its doors. Although the regents had promised that
black faculty members would not be displaced, none was hired at FSU.
80Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement (for CS/SB 68, FIU &
FAMU Law Schools, April 27, 2000).
81Ibid. Also see Rabby, The Pain and the Promise, 188–190.
82Rabby, The Pain and the Promise, 189.
83Ibid., 5, 183, 188–190, 264.
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Only two applied, and they were rejected. FSU did not hire a black law
school faculty member until 1970.
The new building for FSU’s law school was Roberts Hall, named
after the Florida justice who denied Hawkins admission to UF and first
floated the idea of closing the FAMU law program. FSU’s program grew
quickly but did not enroll a large number of black students. The black
community resented the closing of the FAMU school, and with good
reason. The decisions made in the 1960s undoubtedly have contributed
to the small number of black lawyers in Florida. By the late 1990s, only 2
percent of the state bar members were black.84 One can only imagine
what difference it might havemade if the Board of Regents had opted to
build a new 1,200-student law center at FAMU andworked diligently to
attract both black and white students.
For nearly two decades, FAMU president George W. Gore
successfully maneuvered between the moderate and the arch
segregationists to obtain funds for his university. While his predecessors
were excluded from the Council of Presidents, representing the
universities in the state, Gore participated and found ways to advance
the interests of his institution. On the issue of the law school, however, he
was surprisingly quiet. One historian says flatly that he ‘‘did notmount an
effective campaign’’ to save the school, speculating that he was too
preoccupied with trying to defeat the numerous merger proposals,
proposals that surfaced from the late 1950s through the remainder of
his presidency, to contest the law school’s closing. In this hostile context,
Gore was nonetheless able to expand enrollment, add new programs and
the buildings to house them, and obtain accreditation through the
Southern Association of Colleges and Schools. He retired the year that
the law school closed.
As Gore’s successor in the FAMU presidency, Benjamin L. Perry
explained the significance of FAMU and the private HBCUs in Florida.
The idea that these institutions should be abandoned in light of recent
court rulings and compliance orders was unthinkable for African
Americans: ‘‘Nowhere else in Florida can a young black find the active
models of leadership that he [sic] sees in our black institutions.Nowhere
else can a black youngster find the type of sympathetic understanding
and support that he [sic] finds at our black institutions.’’85 FAMU and
privateHBCUs provided Black Floridians withmore than an education;
they provided emotional, social and academic support that was not
available to them at historically white institutions.86 Thirteen thousand
84Johnson and Borman, ‘‘Competing Ideals.’’
85Perry, ‘‘Black Colleges,’’ 75.
86Ibid., 69–78.
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students had graduated from FAMU by 1975. To inspire more students
to pursue a college degree, these institutions needed to remain ‘‘visible
and vibrant.’’ African Americans supported desegregation of
educational institutions; however, they realized that desegregation of
white universities would move at a snail’s pace, and without HBCUs
many African American students would be denied a college education.
Therefore, it was necessary to maintain FAMU to ensure post-
secondary educational opportunities for African Americans.87 He
argued that the Black colleges do more than any other institutions to
inspire their graduates to serve others and to ‘‘live for ideals and goals
that are bigger than ourselves.’’ Perhaps the greatest good the Black
colleges could dowould come fromwhat he called ‘‘inverse integration,’’
bywhich hemeant thatwhite students would begin to attend historically
Black colleges and be similarly inspired.88 Perry’s vision would remain
unfulfilled as would any hope that the federal government would use its
expanded powers under the Civil Rights Act to bring about rapid
desegregation of white universities. However, NAACP litigation
spanning nearly twenty years would establish in law if not in fact a
vision very similar to Perry’s, one in which white universities would be
desegregated and Black universities would be strengthened to serve
blacks’ needs and attract white students.
As the department charged with enforcing the CRA in education
matters, the Department of Health Education andWelfare (HEW) did
not use its new powers with any vigor to leverage change in higher
education.Near the end of the Johnson administration theHEWOffice
of Civil Rights (OCR) requested desegregation plans from ten states
found to have continued dual systems of higher educationFArkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Five states responded by
submitting desegregation plans; however, their plans were deemed
inadequate. Florida and the remaining states ‘‘totally ignored HEW’s
requests.’’89 Richard Nixon made a concerted effort to attract white
suburban voters in the Southwith his ‘‘Southern strategy’’ and adopted a
87Ibid.; Deirdre Cobb-Roberts and Barbara Shircliffe, ‘‘The Legacy of
Desegregation in Florida,’’ in Borman and Dorn.
88Perry, ‘‘Black Colleges,’’ 76. For a discussion of how threats to FAMU continued
through the 1990s and affected educational policy, see Johnson andBorman, ‘‘Competing
Ideals of University Governance.’’
89Kenneth Adams et al. v. Elliot L. Richardson, Individually, and as Secretary of the
Department of Health, Education, andWelfare, et al., 356 F. Supp. 92; 1973 U.S. Dist. Lexis
14877. Nineteen states had at one time operated dual systems, but the Adams litigation
focused on ten found to be still operating such systems.
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policy of non-enforcement in civil rights.90 Faced with southern whites’
intransigence andHEW’s failure to act six years after passage of the act,
the LDF filed a class action lawsuit in federal district court on behalf of
Black students, citizens, and taxpayers to compel HEW and secretary
Eliot Richardson to enforce the law. The goal was for HEW to threaten
withholding funding from states and institutions that had not taken
sufficient steps to desegregate. In Adams v. Richardson (1973), the court
ordered HEW to enforce the law and require states to desegregate
university systems at all levels and to strengthen HBCUs.91 Upheld on
appeal, this order seemed to place the biggest lever of the Civil Rights
Act under the rock of segregation.
The court victory and specific features of Adams seemed to offer
hope of quick action.UnlikeBrown II, which delegated responsibility for
desegregation to local school districts, affording each one an
opportunity to resist, Adams focused on state action. States and the
centralized governing bodies that typically oversaw higher education
systemswere required to take action affecting the entire system, offering
the possibility of leveraging change in the entire system at once. It was
not to be, however, because HEW did not push on the lever. In 1977,
Adams v. Califano found that Florida and five other states had ‘‘not
achieved desegregation or submitted acceptable and adequate
desegregation plans,’’ yet HEW had failed to take enforcement action.
Even under the pressure of litigation, Florida did not produce an
acceptable plan until 1978, fourteen years after passage of the Civil
Rights Act and twenty-four years after the U.S. Supreme Court
determined that Brown applied to higher education and ordered
Florida to admit Hawkins to UF.92
90Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); John B.Williams, Race Discrimination
in Public Higher Education: Interpreting Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 1964–1996
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997).
91Adams v. Richardson;Adams v.Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 269; 1975U.S.Dist. Lexis
13359; Adams v. Califano, 430 F. Supp. 118; 1977 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16561; Adams v. Bell,
228 U.S. App. D.C. 375; 711 F.2d 161; 1983 U.S. App. Lexis 26884. The Legal Defense
Fund (LDF) filed suit against each secretary of Health Education Welfare (HEW) and
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From declining enrollments in HBCUs in the years following
passage of the CRA, some scholars argue that the decline was an
unintended consequence of expanding opportunities brought about by
the act and efforts to enforce it inAdams.93 It is also important to keep in
mind, as Florida’s response to passage of the act shows, that white
officials like Culpepper used the act to justify attacking Black
institutions, closing them completely, as in the case of the junior
colleges and FAMU law school, or diminishing them. The threatened
closure of FAMU law school very likely reduced enrollments the last
three years of its existence, further weakening supporters’ ability to keep
the school open.94 The court in Adams v. Califano tried to curtail such
efforts. After quoting the first Adams case, ‘‘Black institutions currently
fulfill a crucial need and will continue to play an important role in Black
higher education,’’ the court noted ‘‘the real danger that desegregation
will diminish higher education opportunities for Blacks.’’ The court
established a standard that the ‘‘process of desegregation must not place
a greater burden on Black institutions or Black students’ opportunity to
receive a quality public higher education.’’95
Florida’s white officials continued to resist desegregating white
institutions. Three years after submitting an acceptable plan, there was
still little progress in the three areas covered by the plan: (1)
disestablishment of the structure of the dual system, including
strengthening historically Black colleges; (2) desegregation of student
enrollment at all levels, undergraduate, graduate, and professional, at
‘‘traditionally white universities;’’ and (3) desegregation of faculty and
administrative staffs, nonacademic personnel, and governing boards.
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found that Florida had
concentrated Black enrollment in the community colleges and FAMU
while making little progress desegregating the white universities.96
Conclusion: The Dilemmas of Access
FollowingWorldWar II, the tremendous push for civil rights occurred
during a period of higher educational expansion. The Civil Rights
Movement made great gains in challenging segregation on the grounds
that equality of access was necessary to achieve equality of opportunity.
93Gail Thomas and James McFarland, ‘‘Have College Desegregation Policies
Threatened Black Enrollment and Black Colleges? An Empirical Analysis,’’ Journal of
Negro Education 53, no. 4 (1984): 389–397.
94Senate Staff Analysis and Rabby, The Pain and the Promise.
95Adams v. Califano, 430 F. Supp. 118; 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16561, 7. The court
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96Williams, The Black/White Colleges, 6. For a more extensive discussion of these
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Yet as in Florida, state leaders wanted to expand higher education while
maintaining segregation.Confrontedwith pressures to openhistorically
white universities to African Americans, state officials and higher
education leaders developed a variety of strategies to maintain
segregation, including resisting the desegregation of UF, instituting a
segregated system of community colleges and threatening to close
FAMU. Redefining access to mean a choice between strengthening
historically Black institutions or the token desegregation of white ones
undermined efforts to expand postsecondary opportunities for African
Americans.
Despite some gains in desegregating its university system, Florida
has never fulfilled the requirements of its agreements with the federal
government to desegregate white universities, and the proportion of
students belonging to minority groups has dropped in the historically
white schools throughout the State University System since Governor
Jeb Bush issued an executive order, the One Florida Initiative, banning
the consideration of race and gender in university admissions. This
program treats access as amatter of formal criteria such as test scores and
grades and has limits admissions officers’ ability to take race into
account. Ironically, this initiative allows universities to consider
alumni status, family wealth and capacity to contribute to the
institution, as well as a number of other factors. But universities may
not consider the very things that have been the basis of long-standing
discrimination. The centerpiece of the initiative guarantees the top 20
percent of graduates in each high school a spot at a state university, but
this provision has not increased Black enrollment as promised. The
outcome has been a system in which African American students are
shunted into the least prestigious postsecondary institutions, the
community colleges. Under these conditions, FAMU has become
increasingly important in providing opportunities for a university
education. Although Florida reestablished a law school connected to
FAMU, it has not fulfilled the promises made in desegregation
agreements between 1978 and 2003. Increasing Blacks’ educational
opportunities will require increasing efforts to strengthen FAMUand to
increase access to historically white universities.97
97Johnson and Cobb-Roberts, ‘‘One Florida’’; Williams, The Black/White Colleges.
358 History of Education Quarterly
